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LEGAL RAPE: THE MARITAL
RAPE EXEMPTION
SANDRA L. RYDER*
AND SHERYL A. KUZMENKA**

Rape is a crime by which a male has sexual intercourse forcibly
and without the consent of the female.' From a woman's perspective, if she chooses not to have intercourse with a specific man and
the man chooses to proceed against her will, he has perpetrated a
criminal act of rape. 2 Marital rape, the rape of a wife by her husband, is a topic which most people do not seriously consider. California Senator Bob Wilson, expressing the views of many on the3
topic, inquired, "[i]f you can't rape your wife, who can you rape?"
Although society recognizes that family violence is a serious and
pervasive problem, often requiring intervention by the criminal justice system, marital rape has not raised the public eyebrow, despite
its alarming frequency. 4 Statistics indicate that one out of every
seven women "who has ever been married, has been raped by a hus-5
band at least once, and sometimes many times over many years."
Despite its apparent pervasiveness, 6 common law formulations of
the offense of rape traditionally have excluded nonconsensual acts
of sexual intercourse between married persons. 7 This legal immunity, provided to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, is
* B.S., Illinois State University, 1969; M.A., Literature, 1973; M.A., Social
Sciences, 1980; J.D. with distinction, The John Marshall Law School, 1984. Ms.
Ryder is currently a Doctoral Student of Philosophy at DePaul University, Chicago and teaches at Oak Forest High School.
** B.A., Northwestern University, 1989. Ms. Kuzmenka is currently studying medicine at Loyola University, Chicago, Stritch School of Medicine.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (5th ed. 1979).
2. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 18 (1975).
3. S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 74 (1987).
4. Note, Marital Rape, 9 NOVA L.J. 351 (1985); see also Griffin, In 44
States, It's Legal to Rape Your Wife, 9 STUDENT LAW. 57 (1980).
5. D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 2 (1982). The conclusion is based upon
a random sampling of 930 women which Russell generalized to the population
at large.
6. Id; see also R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW (1984); Griffin, supra
note 4, at 57 (suggesting that as many as two million women may be raped annually by their husbands).
7. The husband cannot be prosecuted for rape despite the elements of the
crime of rape: lack of consent, use of force, and sexual penetration. See generally 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 283-290, 1-43 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1978). For
various state statutes which incorporate the marital rape exemption, see infra
notes 174, 176-188 and accompanying text.
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called the marital rape exemption. 8 Despite its anachronistic viewpoint toward women, marriage, and society today, the marital rape
exemption still exists in many states, depriving a woman of bodily
integrity vis-a-vis her husband, subjecting her to harsh physical and
emotional penalties 9 as victim of her husband's forcible sexual assaults, and denying her the right of a single woman to legal recourse against her attacker.
This article first examines the historical origins of the exemption. Next, it critically scrutinizes the justifications, both legal and
historical, for the marital rape exemption, its possible constitutional
implications, and recent cases and statutes moving toward its
abrogation.
HISTORICAL

Rape laws developed to protect the interests of men, not the
victimized women, whom men viewed as property. Men designed
laws to prevent abduction of propertied virgins, a crime they viewed
as akin to damaging another man's property. l0 From this perspective, prosecuting a husband for raping his wife made no more sense
than indicting him for stealing his own property. 1 After being abducted and ravished, a propertied woman who was a virgin could
save her rapist by marrying him. 12 The primary issue was the consolidation of the property interests of the two, not vindication for
13
the victim's injury.
The actual legal genesis of the marital rape exemption is a
statement made three hundred years ago by Sir Matthew Hale:
"[b]ut the husband can not be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given herself in this kind unto her husband
8. See Comment, The Marital Rape Exemption, 27 LOY.L. REV. 597 (1981);
see also Note, Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 306-09 (1977).

9. See Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's
Right of Privacy,11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 717, 718 (1981); see, e.g., Burgess &
Holstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE OFFENDER (D. Chappell, R. Geis, G. Geis eds. 1977). One study of
rape found that of 646 rapes studies, 85% involved physical violence, including
beating, choking, successive attacks and use of weapons. M. AMiR, FORCIBLE
RAPE, RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 51 (L. Schultz ed. 1975); see also injfra notes 134-149,
151, for a discussion of the effects of violence on the married victim.
10. For a chronology of historical developments in rape, see S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 11-22; B. TONER, THE FACTS OF RAPE 112-30 (1977).

11. Freeman, "But if you can't Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape":
The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8 (1981).
12. This practice came to be known as the "subsequent marriage doctrine."
See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 16.
13. Id.
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which she can not retract."'1 4 Since the "subsequent marriage" doctrine15 allowed a rapist to escape prosecution by marrying his victim, it could be argued as a corollary that rape within the marriage
16
would result in the same immunity.
Contrary to his usual practice, Lord Hale cited no legal authority for this proposition. 17 He also intimated that women could easily
fabricate rape charges, a concern which has evolved today into the
"cry-rape" syndrome.' 8 Given his background as a judge at the 1662
witchcraft trial in Bury St. Edmunds and "systematic biases against
20
women,"' 19 he may have created the marital rape exemption.
Whatever its inception, the fact remains that with little or no independent analysis, 21 authorities have relied upon and cited Hale,
and his unsupported pronouncement became the flimsy fulcrum
upon which the marital rape exemption rested. 22 The issue was not
considered by a court until 1888 in Regina v. C7arence, when the
judges addressed the issue in dicta. 23 Even then the judges divided
on the issue. Two judges, Wills and Field, were opposed to Hale's
pronouncement. Wills argued:
14. 1 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAS 628, 629 (Emelyn ed. 1847);
see also 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (P. Glazenbrook ed. 1971).
15. It has been suggested that an anomaly exists between the "subsequent
marriage" doctrine and Hale's "contractual consent" doctrine in which he expressed his theory. See Comment, supra note 8, at 597; see also Gonring,
Spousal Exemption to Rape, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 120, 122 (1981).
16. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 153, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1985).
17. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 196, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (1981); see also Comment,
The Common Law Does Not Support a Marital Exception for Forcible Rape, 5
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 181, 182-183 (1979) (discussing State v. Smith); Gonring,
supra note 15, at 122.
18. The "cry-rape" argument alleges that if women are allowed to criminally charge their husbands with rape, they will fabricate charges. See Comment, supra note 8, at 600; see also Note, supra note 8, at 314-15; and in'fra notes
108, 111, and accompanying text.
19. Freeman, supra note 11, at 10-11 (citing J. Campbell, Life of ChiefJustice Hale in The Lives of the Chief Justices584 (1849); see 1 M. Hale, HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 629 (P. Glazenbrook ed. 1971); see also Barry,
Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 1088 (1980); Geis, Rape-inMarriage: Law and Law Reform in England, the United States, and Sweden, 6
ADEL. L. REV 284, 285-86 n.11 (1978). The Barry and Geis articles both discuss
Hale's reputed misogyny and his presiding over the witch trials. See generally
Gonring, supra note 15, at 121.
20. Freeman, supra note 11, at 10-11. This article notes that Hale's abstention from citation of authority may be twofold: absence of authority that supported his position and authority which opposed his viewpoint. It further cites
Hale as saying, concerning women, that "there is no wisdom below the girdle."
Id. at 11.
21. Comment, supra note 17, at 182.
22. See Pracher, supra note 9, at 728.
23. Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B. 23 (1888). See Freeman, supra note 11, at 11
for discussion of Hale's marital rape exemption; Comment, supra note 17, at
182.
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If intercourse under the circumstances now in question constitute an
assault on the part of the man, it must constitute rape, unless, indeed,
as between married persons rape is impossible, a proposition to which I
certainly am not prepared to assent, and for which there seems to me
to be no sufficient authority... I cannot understand why, as a general
24
rule, if intercourse be an assault, it should not be rape.
Judge Field, criticizing the lack of authority, also noted "[t]he authority of Hale C.J. on such matter is undoubtedly as high as any
can be but no other authority is cited by him for this proposition
' 25
and I should hesitate before I adopt it."
Only four cases in Britain have considered the spousal exemption; only one actually held, following Hale, that a husband could
not be charged with raping his wife;26 that case was heard in 1949.27
Is our authority, then, only forty years old? "That a rule like the
marital rape exemption could date from a time when the status of
women was supposed to be improved says a lot about that supposition," 28 and that jurisprudence for three hundred years has clung to
Lord Hale's "Contractual Consent" theory29 "says much about con' 30
temporary society and the role of ideology in it."
On the strength of Hale's unsupported statement, the judiciary
in the United States formally recognized the husband's immunity as
early as 1857,31 but perhaps judicial acknowledgement occurred
even earlier. 32 Few cases have dealt with the issue directly 33 be24. Clarence, 22 Q.B. at 33 (Field, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 57.
26. See Regina v. O'Brien, 3 All E.R. 663 (1974); Regina v. Miller, 2 All E.R.
529 (1954); Regina v. Clarke, 2 All E.R. 448 (1948); Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B. 23
(1888); see also Comment, supra note 17, at 182-83 (the court, in Miller, observed
that "[t]he curious fact is that in the years since Hale's Pleas of The Crown there
is no recorded case of a man being prosecuted for the rape of his wife until R. v.
Clarke ... in 1949.").
27. Regina v. Clarke, 2 All E.R. 448 (1949).
28. Freeman, supra note 11, at 12-13.
29. See Note, supra note 8, at 309, n.20; see also Frazier v. State, 48 Tex.
Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905)(application of the contractual consent theory); Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of a Husband For the Rape of His Wife, 84
A.L.R.2d 1017 (1962)(with cases at 1022).
30. Freeman, supra note 11, at 13.
31. Commonwealth v. Fogarty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857). In dicta, the
court stated that a man alone cannot commit a rape upon his own wife. Id. at
490. The issue was not directly before the court, however, so the statement
could not be used to support the common law theory.
32. See State v. Scott, 11 Conn. App. 102, 525 A.2d 1364 (1987). The Scott
court, citing Z. SwiFr, DIGEST 295 (1823), quoted Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift:
"[A] husband cannot by law be guilty of ravishing his wife, on account of the
matrimonial consent which she cannot retract." Scott, 11 Conn. App. at 108, 525
A.2d at 1370. Apparently this theory of constructive consent is derived from
Lord Hale's statement and was incorporated into the common law of Connecticut. But see Note, Sexual Assault: The Case for Removing the Spousal Exemption from Texas Law, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 1041, 1046 (1986)(explaining that
although the marital rape exemption may have been a part of the Texas com-

1991]

Legal Rape: The Marital Rape Exemption

cause most statutory codifications and the common law required, as
an element of rape, that the victim not be the spouse or wife of the
34
perpetrator.
Generally, the various states incorporated the British common
law in force after the Revolutionary War in so far as it did not conflict with the Constitution and state statutes. 35 For example, in
Weishaupt v. Commonwealth,3 6 the court said that English law doctrines which "are repugnant to the nature and character of our
political system" are not adopted; the states are free to examine the
English common law principles to find those which "fit our way of
life and to reject those which do not."'3 7 Since the English courts
only accepted a portion of Hale's statement, the court reasoned that
even under English common law, there never existed an absolute
irrevocable marital exemption that would, under all circumstances,
protect a husband from a charge of rape.38 Confronting the same
issue, the court in Warren v. State39 argued that there had never
been an expressly stated marital exemption; the statute had never
mon law, it did not appear in the Texas Penal Code until 1974. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.01(a) (Vernon 1974)).
33. See Frazier v. State, 48 Tex.Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905). In Frazier,a
wife tried to obtain a divorce but was refused by the court. She stayed in the
same house as her husband, but slept in a separate room. Id. at 142-43, 86 S.W.
at 754-55. When her husband forcibly raped her, she sought redress in the
courts. The court adopted the common law, reversing the lower court conviction, holding that "a man cannot be guilty of raping his wife." Id. at 143, 86 S.W.
at 755. This was the first American case in which the spouses were married and
living together at the time of the incident. But see Regina v. Miller, 2 Q.B. 282
(1954), where the wife had left her spouse and filed a divorce petition at the
time of the incident. Since the divorce was not final, the court held that she still
constructively consented to intercourse, and her husband could not be guilty of
rape. Miller, 2 Q.B. at 285. See generally Comment, For Better or For Worse:
Marital Rape, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 611, 624 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, For Better or For Worse]; Comment, Marital Rape in California: For Better or For
Worse, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1980) [hereinafter Comment, Marital
Rape in California].
34. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 155, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1985); see Comment, Marital Rape in California, supra note 33, at 240 (sexual intercourse
with one's spouse was a "marital right", and as such was "lawful"; rape, then,
became "unlawful" sexual intercourse, thereby excluding wives).
35. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 196, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (1981); Warren v. State,
255 Ga. 151, 155, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1985). The Warren court said "[i]f a common law implied consent theory had attached to our earlier statutory crime of
rape, it could not have survived because it conflicts with our Constitution and
statutory laws." Warren, 255 Ga. at 155, 336 S.E. at 225.
36. 277 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
37. Id. at 393-94, 315 S.E.2d at 850-52.
38. Id. at 393, 315 S.E.2d at 850. The court examined English cases in which
a husband and wife lived separately. From earliest times, a wife who lived separately from her husband was treated differently, because the separation cut off
the husband's "marital right," normally implied as sexual intercourse; however,
that implied consent could be revoked by various means. Id.
39. 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985).
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included the word "unlawful," 40 widely recognized as indicating the
incorporation of the common law spousal exemption; and in the
rape statute, revised in 1968, the legislature omitted the words "not
his wife." Instead, they selected "a person," indicating their intent
to broaden the statute. The court concluded that Georgia had never
intended the common law exception to apply. 41 As the court in
State v. Smith42 aptly explained:
Thus the marital exemption rule expressedly adopted by many of our
sister states has its source in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made
some 300 years ago. Such a declaration cannot itself be considered a
definitive and binding statement of the common law, although legal
commentators have often restated the rule since the time of Hale without evaluating its merits .. .extra-judicial discussions should not always be considered accurate expositions of the common law. In the
absence of case law in this State or in England before the Revolution,

we are more wary than the 4lower
courts here of accepting Hale's rule
3
as part of the common law.

LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION

The first examination of the validity of the marital rape exemption began in the late 1970's. 44 As more jurisdictions have grappled with similar issues, many have held that a husband can be
criminally liable for raping his wife. 45 The court in State v. Smith
summarized by saying, "The fact that many jurisdictions have
mechanically applied the rule, without evaluating its merits under
40. For a discussion of the significance of using the word "unlawful," see
Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 127, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (1981);
State v. Willis, 223 Neb. 844, 846, 394 N.W.2d 648, 650 (1986); R. TONG, supra
note 6, at 95; see also supra note 34 for additional sources.
41. Warren, 255 Ga. at 155, 336 S.E.2d at 225.
42. 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
43. Smith, 85 N.J. at 196, 426 A.2d at 41-42.
44. See Comment, CriminalLaw - New York Court AbrogatesMarital Rape
Exemption as a Violation ofEqual Protection-Peoplev. Liberta, 64 N. Y2d 152,
474 NE.2d 567, 485 N. YS.2d 207 (1984), 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (1985).
Until the rape reform legislation in the 1970's, the exemptions in most state
statutes barred prosecution for rape for legally married, but separated, persons.
See People v. deStefano, 121 Misc.2d 113, 120, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 512
(N.Y.Crim.Ct. 1983)(no serious challenge arose to the marital rape exemption
from the time of Hale's pronouncement until 1977); Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecutions,7 VT. L. REV. 33, 35-36 (1982) (every
state barred wife from prosecuting husband for rape until mid-1970s). See generally Bienen, Rape III - National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 170, 185-86 (1980); Note, supra note 8, at 308-09.
45. See Merton v. State, 500 So.2d 1301 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Williams v.
State, 494 So.2d 819 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Rider, 449 So.2d 903 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981); State v. Smith, 401
So.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152,474 N.E.2d
567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984); People v. deStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d
506 (1983); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
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changed conditions, does not mean that such blind application was
46
part of the 'principles of the common law' adopted in the State."
Three major justifications are usually cited for the marital exemption. The first is that the woman was the property of her father,
and after marriage, her husband.47 The second rationale is the unity
of person or unity through marriage theory. Under this concept the
legal existence of the woman merged or consolidated with that of
her husband during marriage. The two incorporated into one, and
that one was the man.48 The third justification for the exemption
asserts that by consenting to marriage, the woman casts an irrevocable assent to sexual intercourse with her husband.49 "A closer examination of the theories and justifications indicates that they are
no longer valid, if they ever had any validity."5 0 Examination of the
three theories and justifications underpinning the marital rape exemption will reveal that none withstands scrutiny in light of contemporary views of women, marriage and society.
As previously mentioned, 51 rape was proscribed in order to protect the chastity of women and thus their value as property both to
their fathers, and to their husbands after marriage.5 2 Ironically,
laws protected slaves, considered chattel until the mid-nineteenth
century, from rape.53 John Stuart Mill decried the policy, conceding
that:
[A] female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right, and is
considered under a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last
familiarity. Not so the wife: however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to-though she may know that he hates her, though
it may be his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it
46. Smith, 85 N.J. at 198, 426 A.2d at 43.
47. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 153, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1985);
Smith v. State, 85 N.J. 193, 198, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981); People v. Liberta, 64
N.Y.2d 152, 158, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (1984); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227
Va. 389, 394, 315 S.E. 2d 847, 852 (1984).
48. See, e.g., Warren, 255 Ga. at 153, 336 S.E.2d at 223; Smith, 85 N.J. at 198,
425 A.2d at 44; Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 158, 474 N.E.2d at 573; see also Freeman,
supra note 11, at 16-17.
49. See Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 153, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1985); Smith v.
State, 85 N.J. 193, 197, 426 A.2d 38, 42 (1981); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227
Va. 389, 393-94, 315 S.E.2d 847, 850-852 (1984); see also R. TONG, supra note 6, at
95; M. VErrERLING-BRAGGIN, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 335 (1977).
50. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 153-54, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223-24 (1985).
51. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
52. See S. BROWNMILLER supra note 2, at 8-22;

see also Comment, Rape

Laws, Equal Protectionand Privacy Rights 54 TULANE L. REV. 456, 457 (1980); 2
W. BURDICK, LAW OF CRIMES 218-225 (1946); State v. Smith, 85 N.J. at 204, 426
A.2d at 38.

53. See Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151 at 155, 336 S.E.2d at 225; Duffy, Abrogation of a Common Law Sanctuaryfor Husband Rapists: Warren v. State, 2 DET.
C. L. REV. 559, 606 (1986)(citing Ga. Code § 4248 (1863) which defined rape as
carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will, whether free or
slave).
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impossible not to loathe him-he can claim from her and enforce the
lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations'. . .[m]arriage
is the only actual bondage known to our law.
There remain no legal
55
slaves, except the mistress of every house.
The concept of woman as chattel has been abandoned in our society.
In Trammel v. United States,56 the Court decided that "[n]o where
in the common-law world-[or] in any modern society-is a woman
regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human
being. '57 Thus, the rationale of woman as property of her husband
is outmoded, invalid, and falls to support the marital rape
exemption.
The related justification whereby the wife's identity merges
with that of her husband is anachronous today. Blackstone in 1765
wrote that the wife's being or legal existence is suspended during
marriage, merged into her husband's, "under whose wing, protection, and cover she performs every thing. '58 If the husband and wife
consolidated into one being, rape in marriage then became paradoxically impossible, since a man cannot rape "himself."5 9 Vestiges of
this policy remain, for example, when a wife is referred to as her
husband's "better half."
In many areas of the law, the hand-tying disabilities of wives
were abandoned with the legal fictions upon which they rested. The
Married Women's Property Acts adopted by the states allowed a
married woman to sue and be sued, own and convey property, enter
and enforce contracts, and otherwise enjoy the rights of unmarried
women. 60 Many jurisdictions have abolished the interspousal tort
immunity; women can testify against their husbands as well as sue
for various torts.6 ' The changes in both the legal status of married
54.
55.
56.
57.

J.S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, in THREE ESSAYS 463 (1912).
Id. at 522.
455 U.S. 40 (1980).
Id. at 52.
58. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND Vol. I, 442
(1978). Although Blackstone commented on nearly all aspects of the marital
relations, it is significant that he does not mention Hale's "contractual consent"
theory. See Note, supra note 8, at 310-12; H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (1968).
59. This is similar to the rationale underlying interspousal immunity,
wherein a husband cannot sue "himself." See generally Note, Interspousal Im-

munity-A Policy OrientedApproach, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 491, 492-3 (1967); M.
VETTERLING-BRAGGIN, supra note 49, at 326-327.

60. See H. Clark, supra note 58, at 219; see also Note, supra note 8, at 310-12.
61. See Comment, Toward Abolition of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 36
MONT. L. REV. 251 (1975); many of the same justifications are offered to support
interspousal immunities as for retaining the husband's rape immunity. Cf.W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, 863 (4th ed. 1971), but note
changes at 641-43 (6th ed. 1976). See also infra note 120.
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women and social attitudes have otherwise made the husband's immunity outdated. First, marriage is viewed as an equitable partnership. 62 In addition, with abandonment of the viewpoint that women
are property, rape laws now protect a woman's personal safety and
freedom of choice. 63 The antiquated, common law rationales subjugating the status of women in marriage are logically inadequate to
justify statutes which subject married women to forcible, undesirable sexual attacks by their husbands.
The third and most cited 64 justification for the marital rape exemption lies in contract theory arising from the marriage vows; it is
known as Lord Hale's contractual theory.65 According to Hale, the
wife, by consenting to marry, also consented irrevocably to her husband's exercising his "marital right of intercourse" whenever he
desired.6 7 Hale's ruling made rape, forcible sexual intercourse without consent, between spouses definitively impossible. One of the elements of rape is lack of consent, and consent was irrevocably and
constructively implied during the tenure of the marriage by virtue
of the marriage vows. 68 This construction of implied consent held,
"even if the woman did not in fact consent at the time of
'69
intercourse.
An analysis of Hale's theory using contract law indicates that
the marital vows do not constitute a valid contract. For example,
the joining of two lives in marriage is not analogous to a business
deal. Additionally, all of the elements of a contract which are normally delineated are not present. Ordinarily the parties agree to the
terms of a contract and spell them out. Such is not the case with
traditional marriage vows; in contrast,"[i]ts provisions are unwrit62. Note, supra note 8, at 311.
63. Id. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976 and Supp. 1989); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch.38, para. 12-13(a)(1) and 14 (1981 and Supp. 1989).
64. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 153, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1985); see
also Note, supra note 29, at 311.
65. The contract theory is discussed in the text accompanying notes 14 and
43. See also Warren, 255 Ga. at 151, 336 S.E.2d at 222. The Warren court posed
the question: "When a woman says I do, does she give up her right to say I
won't?" 336 S.E.2d at 223 (1985); Griffin, supra note 4, at 21-23, 57-61 (1980).
Additional discussion of contract theory appears in Freeman, supra note 11, at
10; see also Comment, Sexism and the Common Law: Spousal Rape in Virginia,
8 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 369 (1986).
66. R. v. Clarke, 2 All E.R. 448, 448 (1949); see also Note, Abolishing the
Marital Exemption for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 201,
202.
67. See, e.g., People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 466, 193 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1963);
People v. Pizzura, 211 Mich. 71, 73, 178 N.W. 235, 236 (1920); Frazier v. State, 48
Tex. Crim. 142, 143, 86 S.W. 754, 755 (1905); see also S. BROWNMILLER, supra
note 2, at 6-22; Note, supra note 29, at 311; Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 641 (1976).
68. See Note, supra note 32, at 1042; Harman, Consent, Harm, and Marital
Rape, 22 J. FAM. L. 423, 424 (1983-84).
69. Comment, supra note 17, at 183.
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ten, its penalties are unspecified, and the terms of the contract are
typically unknown to the 'contracting' parties. Prospective spouses
are neither informed of the terms of the contract nor are they allowed any options about these terms. ' 70 All that a marriage obli71
gates the parties to do is love and honor each other until death,
which are very vague terms for a contract. To form a valid contract,
"an objective manifestation of intent to agree" is needed, 72 and it is
doubtful that modern women would knowingly agree that marriage
means irrevocably consenting to sexual intercourse upon demand. 73
It is also questionable whether Hale's theory meets the prerequisites of either an express or implied contract 74 and marriage is not
purely a business activity; contract law should not be applied to it as
such.

Feminists offer an alternative solution to the contract issue.
They aver that by acquiescing to marry, a woman does not also
agree to a life of sexual slavery by which she unconditionally surrenders her body to her husband without requiring the same irrational behavior of him. 75 Next, if a woman explicitly irrevocably
consented to sexual intercourse upon demand of her husband, enforcement would pose a hardship to law enforcement agents. Feminists conclude that "even if unconditional intercourse contracts
exist," they are unenforceable, and therefore void. 76 Thus, reading
marriage vows as bestowing irrevocable consent is ludicrous. Moreover, even if marriage is viewed as a personal service contract, the
remedies for breach do not generally include specific performance
or forced enforcement. 77 Instead, husbands who felt their wives
had breached the marriage "contract" by declining consent could
seek redress through divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, or
70. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage:Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1974).
71. In Lord Hale's time, marriage was, in fact, until death, since divorce was

virtually unknown. Today, however, such is not the case. See irkfra notes 17679 for statutes pertaining to rape and marital status.
72. See Comment, supra note 8, at 598 (quoting Barry, Spousal Rape: The
Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 1088 (1980).
73. See Scott, 11 Conn. App. at 224, 525 A.2d at 65; see also Hines v. Hines,
192 Iowa 569, 571, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (1921).
74. See, e.g., Prosser, Delay in Acting on an Applicationfor Insurance,3 U.

CHI. L. REV. 39 (1935). Prosser explains that both implied and express contracts
rest upon the intent of the parties, requiring agreement, meeting of minds, and
intent to promise and be bound. Id at 49.
75. R. TONG, supra note 6, at 95; M. VEITERLING-BRAGGIN, supra note 49, at
335; see also Note, supra note 29, at 311 (noting that "none of the cases that rely
on the consent rationale to exempt a husband from rape charges has cited any
holding outside the rape context that marriage implies consent to copulation at
all times.").
76. R. TONG, supra note 6, at 95.
77. Id; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 598.
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78
suit for damages, alienation of affection, or criminal conversion.
A wife's action of marrying her husband does not in fact mean that
she expressly or implicitly consents to sexual relations under any
and all conditions; thus, "[iun light of the distinguishable factors of
a marriage contract, the only rationale for Lord Hale's contract theory is that 'the consent given is implied by law, regardless of either
party's expectation to the contrary.' 79 The New Jersey Supreme
Court stated that:
this implied consent rationale, besides being offensive to our valued
ideals of personal liberty is not sound where the marriage itself is not
irrevocable. If a wife can exercise a legal right to separate from her
husband and eventually terminate the marriage 'contract,' may she not
also revoke a 'term' of that contract, namely, consent to intercourse?
Just as a husband has no right to imprison his wife because of her marriage vow to him... he has no right to force sexual relations upon her
against her will. If her refusals are a 'breach' of the marriage 'contract', his8 0remedy is in a matrimonial court, not in violent or forceful
self-help.

Hale's theory fails for other reasons as well. If the argument
ever had credence, it became obsolete with the arrival of divorce
laws.8 1 Second, it creates a double standard; the courts apply an
implied consent theory when rape is involved, but not to other violent, domestic crimes. A wife is not presumed to irrevocably consent to assault, battery, or other violence, but the courts make this
presumption when rape is involved.8 2 Additionally, the underlying,
yet unreasonable, tenet of the exemption is that the wife intends to
make her body constantly sexually available to her husband.8 3 Marriage law has never required a wife to unconditionally consent to
her husband's demands for sexual intercourse. She can refuse sexual demands that are unreasonable or inordinate,8 4 or if he has a
venereal disease.8 5 In fact, U.S. courts have held that a husband has
a duty of forebearance at the reasonable request of his wife. 86 Overall, the irrevocable consent theory is not accepted as adequate justification for the marital rape exemption; in fact, one commentator
has noted that "[t]he doctrine of permanent consent recently has
78. See id.
79. Id. at 598-99 (quoting from Comment, The Marital Exception to Rape:
Past, Present & Future, 1978 DET. C.L. REV. 261, 263 n.13 (1978) (citing S. STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 72-73 (E. Jenks

14th ed.

1903)).

80. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 205, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981).
81. Note, supra note 66, at 206; see also R. v. Clark, 2 All E.R. 448 (1949).
82. See Gonring, supra note 15, at 123-24; Note, supra note 8, at 312-13.
83. Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L.

REV. 719, 722 (1954).
84. See Holborn v. Holborn, All E.R. 32, 32-33 (1947).
85. Foster v. Foster, 152 T.L.R. 70 (1921).
86. Hines v. Hines, 192 Iowa 569, 571, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (1921).
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been characterized as legal fiction, since it appears unrealistic to assume that modern women give unqualified consent to sexual relations with their husbands during marriage. '8 7 Also, a consent
theory based solely upon marital status is unrealistic. Couples,
although married, may live apart with mutual agreement as to nonintimacy. The exemption would apply and protect a transgressing
husband from prosecution, but ironically, not a male involved in a
cohabiting, non-marital relationship.8 8 In summary, "[e]ven if the
consent rationale was justified when first articulated, it is entirely
inconsistent with today's concept of egalitarian sexual relationships... ;'[S]exual intercourse must be mutually desired and not
viewed as a wifely 'duty' ",89 and should not be used to thwart justice. Courts recognize that women have a right to sexual privacy,
and "policy considerations should propel us to insist that such lawless evasions not be condoned under the guise of nice applications of
contract law." 90
The final objection to Hale's consent doctrine lies in the definition of rape itself. Since rape is a crime of violence, 9 1 not of sex, the
consent theory is meaningless. Even if a wife could consent to all
sexual relationships with her husband, the presumption is that each
time her husband forces her to engage in intercourse, his compulsion is sexual; obviously, since rape is a violent, aggressive crime
rather than a sexual act, the wife cannot consent to being raped by
her husband. The Georgia Supreme Court held that:
no normal woman.. .would knowingly include an irrevocable term to
her revocable marriage contract that would allow her husband to rape
her.. .It is incredible to think that any state would sanction such behavior by adding an implied consent term to all marriage contracts
that would leave all wives with no protection under the law from the
'ultimate violation of self'... simply because they choose to enter into a
relationship that is respected and protected by law. The implied consent theory to spousal rape is without logical meaning, and obviously
conflicts with our Constitutional
and statutory laws and our regard for
92
all citizens of this State.
It is therefore unreasonable to assume that a woman who recites a
marriage vow also consents to acts of violence against her will.
Under both contract theory and in light of changes in the status of
87. Note, supra note 32 at 114 (1980).
88. Note, supra note 66, at 206-07; see also Comment, MaritalRape in California, supra note 33, at 242-43.
89. Note, supra note 29, at 313.
90. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 228, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (1977), aff'd,
169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
91. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 164, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573, 485
N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985); see also Comment,
Marital Rape in California,supra note 33, at 243-44.
92. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 155, 336 S.E.2d 221, 224-25 (1985) (emphasis
added); see also Note, supra note 8, at 312-13.
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women and marriage in contemporary society, Lord Hale's consent
theory fails.
OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS
While the traditional theories supporting the marital rape exemption no longer have validity, other arguments have been used
by its proponents to justify its existence. These include: difficulty
93
of proving rape; marital rape as less serious than stranger rape;
"[p]revention of fabricated charges; [p]reventing wives from using
rape charges for revenge; [and] [p]reventing state intervention into
'94
marriage so that possible reconciliation will not be thwarted.
Proving rape has always been difficult, 95 but supporters of the
marital rape exemption argue that husbands are extremely vulnerable, since most rapes occur when the rapist and victim had a prior
relationship. 96 However, the criminal justice system has safeguards
97
to handle false complaints. As the court in People v. Liberta
pointed out, if the possibility of fabricated complaints were a basis
for not criminalizing behavior that otherwise would be sanctioned,
almost all crimes other than homicide would go unpunished. 98 The
Warren court concurred, stating that,
There is no other crime we can think of in which all of the victims are
denied protection simply because someone might fabricate a charge;
there is no evidence that wives have flooded the district attorneys with
revenge filled trumped-up charges, and once a marital relationship is
at the point where a husband 99
rapes his wife, state intervention is
needed for the wife's protection.
93. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 573-74, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
94. Warren, 255 Ga. at 153-54, 336 S.E.2d at 223. For a general discussion of
continued support for the marital rape exemption, see Comment, supra note 65,
at 369-76.
95. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
96. Id. See Note, supra note 8, at 314 n.5. See also Griffin, supra note 4, at
57. See generally Zamora, Warren v. State: One Attempt to Modernize the Marital Rape Exemption, 10 AMER. J. TR. ADV. 157, 164 (1986).
97. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.2d 207 (1984).
98. Id. at 164, 474 NE.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
99. Warren, 255 Ga. at 155, 336 S.E.2d 221 at 225. Actually the reverse is
true. Victims are reluctant to report being raped. The court cited statistics to
show that the average person ranks alleged husband-wife rapes the lowest in
credibility, and juries convict only 3 of 42 suspects in simple rape cases where
one assailant knew the victim and there is no extrinsic violence. In addition,
the state intervenes in assault, battery and other domestic violence, and assault
and battery are involved in rape. Id. See Note, supra note 8, at 314-15 ("rape
prosecutions are often more shameful for the victim than the defendant"); see
also Comment, supra note 8, at 601. Fabrication of rape charges is unsubstantiated. Id.
While men successfully convinced each other and us that women cry rape
with ease and glee, the reality of rape is that the victimized women have
always been reluctant to report the crime and seek legal justice-because
of the shame of public exposure, because of that complex double standard
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Another, related, reason for abolishing the exemption is that the
law operates as a deterrent and educator. Theoretically and perhaps actually, some husbands will be deterred from spousal rape by
abolition of the exemption. Others will come to recognize marital
rape as a criminal act, and that they are responsible for behavior
that violates a woman's bodily integrity. 1°°
One rationale for asserting the marital rape exemption is reluctance of law enforcement agencies to interfere in the marital relationship.10 1 The basis of the argument as delineated in Griswold v.
Connecticut is that interfering in the affairs of the husband and
wife violates the penumbral right of privacy guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. 0 2 The marital right to privacy recognized in Griswold
was designed to recognize the "freedom of married persons" to
make choices about their married life without state intrusion. 0 3
This freedom, however, does not grant to husbands the right to violently and nonconsensually rape their wives.' 0 4 In a spousal rape
case, "the right to privacy is claimed by one spouse over the objection of the other. Flowing from this, the second erroneous and
rather cavalier assumption is that the assaulting spouse's right to
privacy is superior to the injured spouse's right to protection."' 0 5

The eventual philosophical problem becomes a balancing between
the right to marital privacy versus the privacy right of the individl°
ual. The Court addressed this problem in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 6
Recognizing the individual's right of privacy as superceding that of
the marital right to privacy, the court stated:
The marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
that makes a female feel culpable, even responsible, for any act of sexual
aggression committed against her. . .and because women have been
presented with sufficient evidence to come to the realistic conclusion that
their accounts are received with a harsh cynicism that forms the first line
of male defense.
S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 1091.

100. Comment, ForBetter of For Worse, supra note 33, at 616. See generally
Schwartz, supra note 44, at 51. For an opposing viewpoint, see Griffin, supra
note 4, at 57 (Ronald Sklar quoted as saying that the criminal justice system will
lose credibility if marital rape becomes criminalized).
101. Comment, For Better of For Worse, supra note 33, at 614-15; Comment,
Marital Rape in California,supra note 33, at 246 (citing LeGrande, Rape and
Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 939 (1973)).
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For further discussion on privacy interests, see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
103. 381 U.S. at 507 (White, J., concurring).
104. Marital rape is not consensual sexual conduct. Griswold did not prohibit state intrusion in regulating nonconsensualsexual behavior. See generally
Note, supra note 66, at 215-16.
105. Note, supra note 8, at 333 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980)). Aside from confidential communications, the witness spouse alone
holds the privilege to testify, which the accused cannot assert for her. Id.
106. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
10 7
child.
Just as the Baird decision emphasizes personal, as opposed to mari10 8
tal privacy rights, other later decisions reinforced those rights.
Allowing a husband to legally and forcibly rape his wife against her
will robs that woman of her right to make fundamental decisions
about her bodily integrity, separate and distinct from any marital or
family relationship, purportedly guaranteed by the Supreme Court.
Applying the privacy right to marital rape sets in motion a
chain of intrafamilial violence. 10 9 Law enforcement agencies are
skeptical of the complainant in domestic violence situations; domestic disputes are often violent and result in few prosecutions.1 10 Proponents of this argument hold that it is inappropriate for the state
to interfere in the institution of marriage and family; however, the
state already intercedes into intrafamilial matters. For example,
laws prohibit incest, child abuse and wife abuse. Should we
decriminalize incest because it is a "family matter?"1
Applying
the reasoning of marital rape exemption proponents, by analogy it
107. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
108. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Miss. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). It has been argued that the marital exemption violates Roe by allowing a husband to impregnate his wife against her
will, which denies her reproductive freedom guaranteed in that case. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 628-30; see also Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 652 (1979), where Justice Stevens argued that inherent in
the right of privacy is the right to make decisions "without public scrutiny and
in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties," because for anyone to interfere with a person's decision "is fundamentally at odds
with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to [that
person's] decision." Id. at 655-56. If the protected right of privacy is an individual's fundamental right to choose about matters concerning his/her integrity as
a person, the implication is that interference with that right is unconstitutional.
See also Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591, 94 (Pa. Super. 1986) where
the court held, "[t]he right to privacy within the marital relationship is not absolute and, in this case, must be balanced against the state's interest in protecting an individual's right to the integrity of his or her own body."
109. See Note, supra note 8, at 333 (applying privacy rights to marital rape
encourages chain of violence within the family that becomes a way of life).
110. Id. See Comment, MaritalRape in California,supra note 33, at 246-247,
indicating that law enforcement officials have a "hands-off" attitude toward
marital rape that is unacceptable in other areas of domestic violence and has no
reasonable basis. See LeGrande, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and
Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 939 (1973). Police are not willing and/or are unable
to make arrests. Id. In addition, the family is immune from the law because of
a covert tolerance toward domestic violence on the part of police, judges and
prosecutors, and the legal system itself. Id.
111. Comment, For Better of For Worse, supra note 33, at 614-15. See Comment, MaritalRape in California,supra note 33, at 246-47; see also Comment,
supra note 65, at 370.
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follows that it is not acceptable for a husband to beat his wife, but it
is acceptable for him to rape her.
This same argument could be advocated to turn a deaf ear toward other forms of domestic violence, but law enforcement agencies are called upon in cases of child molestation or wife-beating,
both of which occur within the "sanctity" of the home. The courts,
too, have rejected the argument that the marital rape exemption is
supported by the right of marital privacy, citing other intrusions the
state makes into domestic situations. 112 This attitude regarding
marital rape is not found in other policies concerning marital interference, thus making it unreasonable and inappropriate. 113
Some authorities have argued that abrogating the marital rape
exemption would increase the risk of fabricated accusations" 4 or be
5
used by vindictive wives as a weapon against estranged husbands."1
However, an examination of the criminal justice system renders
this argument moot. The system is designed to handle fabricated
cases through safeguards of criminal procedures;" 6 but as the Florida Court of Appeals noted, it is not likely that women will spitefully fabricate complaints against their husbands "because the
offense of battery which can now be exerted by one spouse against
another has not been used for such purpose. 11 7 Actually, women
are reluctant, even ashamed, to charge their aggressors with rape,
and their inhibition is exascerbated in marital rape, because the act
is not viewed as criminal, the shame and cynicism are greater, and
the double standard is even more strictly applied when a woman
accuses her husband of rape. 1 8 The Liberta court summarized its
holding by saying that married women are no more likely to fabricate false rape complaints than are unmarried women.119
Overall, it is not in a woman's best interest to fabricate rape
charges against her husband, since the law allows her to charge him
112. See State v. Smith, 401 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See
generally Griffin, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 65, 370-71.
113. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 614-15. See Comment, Marital Rape in California,supra note 33, at 246-47.
114. Note, supra note 8, at 314; see also Note, supra note 4, at 354; Griffin,
supra note 4, at 57.
115. Note, supra note 8, at 314. See Schwartz, supra note 44, at 33. Schwartz
paints an imaginary image, conforming to the fears of the "cry-rape" proponents, of "a horde of spiteful wenches.. .lying in wait for such a change, ready to
blackmail their husbands into favorable divorce settlements or get even for
some real or imagined wrong." Id. at 51; see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 57.
116. R. TONG, supra note 6, at 95-97.
117. State v. Smith, 401 S.2d at 1129.
118. Comment, supra note 8, at 601.

119. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 165, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d
207, 214 (1984).
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with many other crimes which are easier to prove.120 In addition,
rape is a greatly underreported crime because of the social stigma
attached to it; 1 2 1 it casts aspersions on victims that other crimes

usually do not, making wives less, rather than more, likely to prosecute. 122 "The stigma and other difficulties associated with a woman
reporting a rape and pressing charges probably deter most attempts
to fabricate an incident; rape remains a grossly under-reported
crime. ' 123 A wife fixed upon revenge would be more likely to pursue an avenue which is both less embarrassing for her and more
likely to result in her spouse's conviction. 124
Another twist to the argument that the exemption preserves
the sanctity of marriage is the allegation that its abolition would
discourage efforts toward reconciliation 125 and disrupt marriages. 126 In response, the Liberta court said:
While protecting marital privacy and encouraging reconciliation are legitimate State interests, there is no rational relation between allowing
a husband to forcibly rape his wife and these interests. The marital
rape exemption simply does not further marital privacy because
this
127
right of privacy protects consensual acts, not violent assaults.
The stress on reconciliation advances the idea that the family
should be kept intact at all cost, 1 28 but the Supreme Court of Vir-

ginia disagreed, stating:
It is hard to imagine how charging a husband with the violent crime of
rape can be more disruptive of a marriage than the violent act itself.
Moreover, if the marriage has already deteriorated to the point where
intercourse must be commanded at129
the price of violence we doubt that
there is anything left to reconcile.
A further argument suggests that using the marital rape exemption
to promote reconciliation is really an attempt to promote sexual inequality based upon antiquated notions of indissolvable mar120. Note, supra note 8, at 311. A wife could charge her husband with assault, battery, larceny, and fraud. See Liberta,64 N.Y.2d 152, at 164, 474 N.E.2d
at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214; see also Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 155, 336 S.E.2d
221, 225 (1985).
121. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 617; see Freemen;
supra note 11 at 6-7; Griffin, supra note 4, at 57.
122. See Note, supra note 8, at 314-15.
123. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214 n.8.
124. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 617.
125. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 485 N.E.2d at 574, 474 N.E.2d at 574. See also
Comment, ForBetter or For Worse, supra note 33, at 614-15; Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEw ENG. 31 (1980).
126. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 567, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
127. Id.
128. See D. RUSSELL, supra note 5, at 255. The notion that the family should
be kept intact at all costs, such as the wife's autonomy and acceptance of violent
behavior, can only have a negative effect upon the children.
129. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
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riages.130 One commentator argues that "[w]hile perhaps the
concern with reconciliation was appropriate in the 1700s when divorce was nearly unthinkable, such an approach today is harmful to
the individual, to women, and to the society purporting to be democratic and protective of freedom.'' x In summary, it is the husband's violent act of rape, not the wife's subsequent attempts to
seek protection through the criminal justice system that disrupt a
marriage. If the marriage has deteriorated to the point that intercourse is accomplished by forcible, violent assault, what is left to
save, especially if the wife is willing to criminally charge her hus32
band, knowing that a lengthy jail sentence could ensue?
A final argument in defense of the marital rape exemption is
that marital rape is not as serious an offense as other rape and thus
is adequately dealt with by assault statutes, which provide less severe penalties.' 33 Under this theory, the claim is that there is both
a quantitative and qualitative difference between marital rape and
non-spousal rape. 3 4 Quantitatively, the argument is that marital
rape is an infrequent occurrence over which the criminal justice
system need not be concerned 3 5 and qualitatively, that marital
rape is really just a "bedroom quarrel", not equivalent to rape by a
136
stranger.
Surprisingly, data suggests that marital rape occcurs in as many
as fourteen percent of American households, 137 but, due to underreporting as in other rape cases, actual incidence is probably much
higher. 138 "If rape is the most underreported of crimes, then marital rape, which is not even considered a crime, must be the least
complained about category of rape.. .since the law does not regard
marital rape as a crime."'1 39 Some wives do not perceive forcible intercourse by their husbands as a criminal act; instead, they "simply
130. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 615.
131. Id. citing Barshis, The Question of MaritalRape, 6 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L
F. 383 (1983).

132. See Liberta,64 N.Y.2d 152, 165, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213
(1984).

133. Id; see also ILL. ANN.
1989).

STAT.

ch. 38, para. 12-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961 & Supp.

134. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 617 (citing
Schwartz, supra note 44, at 42-43).
135. Id. at 617-18; see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 57. "It is estimated that
more women are raped by their husbands each year than by strangers, acquaint-

ances, or other friends or relatives." Id. at 57.
136. Id.; see also D.

FINKELHOR

& K. YLLO,

THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES

126-

27 (1983); Griffin, supra note 4, at 58-60; Comment, supra note 61, at 371-72.
137. See D. Russell, supra note 5, at 57.
138. Schwartz, supra note 44, at 43; see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 57.
139. Comment, supra note 11, at 6-7.
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accept their submissive position in the relationship.' ' 140 Likewise,
just as the wives failed to see the experience as rape, and the husband-rapists interviewed expressed that they had a right to act as
they had. 141 Surveys indicate that at least ten percent of married
women reported their husbands had used force or threat of force to
gain sexual access. 142
Additionally, no evidence supports the argument that marital
rape is qualitatively less severe than nonmarital rape. Generally,
studies show that "marital rape is frequently quite violent and generally has more severe, traumatic effects on the victim than other
rape.' 43 Often the wife is physically and psychologically destroyed
for long periods after the rape, even more so than in nonmarital
144
rape.
Overall, psychologists concur that marital rape victims suffer
long-term effects 145 which are not ameliorated, and perhaps are aggravated, by knowing the identity of their rapist. 146 The elements of
debasement and degradation present 147 in forcible rape are augmented in marital rape. Victims suffer life-long psychological effects caused by the violence and loss of control of rape, coupled with
a betrayal of trust. Often women trapped in abusive marriages are
raped on multiple occasions, 148 increasing the lasting injuries. In
Warren v. State, the Georgia court summarized the damage inflicted upon wives who have been raped by their husbands:
When you have been intimately violated by a person who is supposed
to love and protect you, it can destroy your capacity for intimacy with
anyone else. Moreover, many wife victims are trapped in a reign of
terror and experience repeated sexual assualts over a period of years.
When you are raped by a stranger you have to live with a frightening
memory. When you are raped by your husband, you have to live with
140. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 618. "There is a
tendency for people to associate conduct as immoral if it is defined 'criminal.'
Thus, spousal rape victims may fail to perceive the incident as rape and simply
accept their submissive position in the relationship." Id.
141. Id. See also D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE 117-138 (1985).
142. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 618. See D.
FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 141, at 117-38; see also D. RUSSELL, supra
note 5, at 18. During interviews, married women denied being raped by their
husbands. When the question was rephrased, however, asking if their husbands
had used force or threat of force to engage in sex, fourteen percent concurred.
Id.
143. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 474 N.E. 2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213. See D.
FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 136, at 126-27.
144. D. RUSSELL, supra note 5, at 359; see also D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO,
supra, note 136, at 126-27; D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 141, at 117-38.
145. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 166, 474 N.E.2d at 575, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
146. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 181 (1976); see also Comment, The Common Law Does Not Support a Marital Exception For ForcibleRape, 5 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 181, 185 (1979).
147. See Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 152, 336 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1985).
148. D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 136, at 127.
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149

Women raped by their husbands lack confidence and have difficulty
forming relationships and trusting others, often to a greater degree
than women raped by a stranger. 150 The frequency and severe psychological and physical effects of marital rape make it a serious

problem warranting abrogation of the marital rape exemption.
As the Liberta court noted, the fact that rape statutes exist is
recognition that the harm caused by a forcible rape is more severe
than that from ordinary assault' 5 ' and that "Short of homicide
[rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.' ",152 Thus, merely allowing a
woman who has been raped by her husband to charge him with assault is not an adequate remedy 153 because it does not redress the
more serious harms:15 4 violence, 15 5 humiliation, degradation and
15 6
domination designed to leave scars on the victim.
Not all women raped by their husbands are physically abused,
further rendering assault remedies inadequate. 157 One commentator pointed out the paradox raised by the court in People v. de Stefano,15 8 when a New York county court suggested that an abusive
husband, intent upon assault and battery, might choose to rape his
wife instead, then hide behind the aegis of the marital rape exemption. 159 The court concluded that allowing any type of exemption
gave a husband control of his wife's bodily integrity, 160 leading to
149. Dr. David Finkelhor's testimony in support of H.B. 516 to remove
spousal exemption to sexual assault offenses, befor the Judicial Committee,
New Hampshire State Legislature (Mar. 25, 1981), quoted in Warren, 255 Ga. at
152 n.4, 336 N.E.2d at 222 n.4.
150. D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 141, at 126; Comment, supra note
146, at 185; see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 58-60.
151. Liberta,64 N.Y.2d at 164-65, 474 N.E.2d at 574-75, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14.
Assault is usually classified as a misdemeanor, whereas first degree rape or its
equivalent, e.g., sexual battery, is a felony See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38, para. 12-1
(Smith-Hurd 1961 & Supp. 1989).
152. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 163-64, 474 N.E.2d at 574-75, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14
(citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1976)).
153. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 166, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214 (the
severe harm caused by marital rape distinguishes that crime from assault). See
generally Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 619-20.
154. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 620.
155. State v. Smith, 401 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); State v.
Willis, 223 Neb. 844, 848, 394 N.W.2d 648, 651 (1986).
156. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 377-78.
157. D. RUSSELL, supra, note 5. Not all of the fourteen percent of wives who
were victims of spousal rape were beaten. Four percent were victimized by
spousal rape alone. Russell urges that if spousal rape is viewed as only a type of
wife-battering, those wives who are raped only will be without a criminal
remedy.
158. 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983).
159. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 620 (citing de Stefano, 127 Misc. 2d at 124, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 514).
160. de Stqfano, 121 Misc. 2d at 124, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
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increased violence. 1 1 Assault remedies are inadequate to redress
the grievous injuries caused by spousal rape; furthermore, the marital rape exemption may actually exascerbate, rather than reduce,
domestic violence.
Proponents of the exemption argue that wives can always seek
relief in divorce court. In this way abolition of the exemption is not
necessary and the criminal court system is avoided. However, divorce fails to provide a proper remedy to a woman raped by her
spouse. 162 Both commentators 163 and the courts 1' 4 have suggested
that a husband who cannot obtain his wife's consent seek his 6rem5
edy through the courts and not by forcibly raping his spouse.'
Although marital rape is more, not less, traumatic than rape by
strangers, 16 6 raped wives in states having the marital rape exemption cannot seek police protection, as can their unmarried counterparts,1

67

because husbands are immune from prosecution under this

archaic doctrine.' 6 8 Recent court cases have found that the marital
exemption in rape statutes violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment 169 by treating married and unmarried
women differently without a rational reason. 170 Since the court
161. Comment, For Better or For Worse, supra note 33, at 620.
162. Id. at 621.
163. Schwartz, supra note 44, at 54; Comment, For Better or For Worse,
supra note 33, at 621.
164. Cf. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981)
165. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. at 206, 426 A.2d at 44. The New Jersey Supreme
Court said "[i]f her repeated refusals are a 'breach' of the marriage 'contract',
his remedy is in a matrimonial court, not in violent or forceful self help." Id.
166. D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 136, at 127 and accompanying
text. See also Comment, supra note 65, at 383.
167. D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 136.
168. Freeman, supra note 11, at 9, says, "The recognition that a husband
commits no crime when he forces his wife to have sexaul intercourse reflects
this ideology. Rape is the denial of self-determination, the rejection of the victim's physical autonomy: it symbolizes 'ultimate disrespect.. .the exercise of the
power of consent over another person.'
169. Merton v. State, 500 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); State v.
Willis, 223 Neb. 844, 845, 394 N.W.2d 648, 649 (1986), discussing the marital rape
exemption said that it unconstitutionally deprives wives of equal protection and
places them in a condition of "involuntary servitude."
170. See Merton, 500 So.2d at 1305; People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 164, 474
N.E.2d 567, 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (1984); see also State v. Willis, 223 Neb.
844, 845, 394 N.W.2d 648, 649 (1986)(discussing the impact of the marital rape
exemption, and noting that it "unconstitutionally deprives spouses of equal protection of the law and places wives in a condition of involuntary servitude."); 2
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317 (1986) Generally, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that those who are similarly situated should be similarly
treated. Most laws make some sort of classification, so at issue is whether the
classification is reasonable. Looking at the nature of the individual's affected
interest, the court employs two tests: the strict scrutiny test is used if a fundamental right or a suspect classification is used. To meet this challenge, the state
must show a compelling interest which justifies the need for the classification;
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found no rational reason for treating married women differently
from unmarried women pursuant to the marital rape exemption, or
for distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape, the marital
rape exemption was declared unconstitutional. 171 In Liberta, the
court stated that "[A] marriage license should not be viewed as a
license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity, since a
married woman has the same right to control her own body as does
an unmarried woman."'172 Among recent decisions which have considered the marital rape exemption, only one has concluded that a
rational basis exists for it. 173 Relying on a 1954 law review Comment, the Colorado Supreme Court said that the exemption "may
remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption of normal marital
relations" and it "[a]verts difficult emotional issues and problems of
proof inherent in this sensitive area.' 174 This paper has previously
175
examined and rejected both of these arguments.
if not, the regulation is struck down; the rational basis test requires only that
some rational relationship, no matter how remote, to a conceivable state objective exists between the regulation and the classification. Id. at 517-27. The
court in People v. Liberta held that the marital rape exemption cannot even
meet the rational relation test. 64 N.Y.2d, at 165, 474 N.E.2d at 575, 485 N.Y.S.2d
at 214.
171. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 163, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213; see also
Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987) (exemption removed from Wyo-

ming Statute because of statutory and societal changes).
172. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213. Surprisingly, in this case the defendant attempted to use the equal protection argument
by contending that the rape statute burdened some, but not all males; i.e., all
but those within the 'marital exemption'. The court rejected this contention. Id.
173. See People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981). For an opposite viewpoint, see Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987), where the court said, "Statutory and societal changes have significantly affected the appropriateness of a
marital rape exception. Today, Hale's theory is both unrealistic and unreasonable. We agree with the court's analysis in.. Liberta,that no rational basis exists
for distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape. The degree of violence
is no less when the victim of a rape is the spouse of the actor." Id. at 778.
174. Brown, 632 P.2d at 1027. The holding of the court in Brown was used
again in People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo. 1982), when the court again
held that the rape exemption had a rational basis. In an unusual application,
the court in State v. Taylor, 726 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1987) (en banc), relying upon
the Flowers holding, found that the marital exceptions to the non-forcible sexual offenses in the statutory rape statute did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at
337. The confusing issue lies in the classification of any type of rape as "nonforcible," since force is an element of rape. (See Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.100 (1989)
defining statutory rape); see also People v. Prudent, 143 Misc. 2d 50, 539
N.Y.S.2d 651, (1989) where the court held that there is no 'marital exception' for
any sexual offenses where the victim's lack of consent is the result of force
since both are elements of the crime of rape. (At the time of writing this atricle,
People v. Prudentis the most recent case on the issue).
175. See supra notes 92-98, 111-130 and accompanying text for discussion of
the effects of the exemption on the marital relationship and the problems of
proof.
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Five states' response to the equal protection challenge upon the
marital rape exemption has been to expand the immunity to cover
cohabitors, too. It is an affirmative defense to a charge of first degree sexual assault that the aggressor and victim were married or
cohabitors at the time of the incident. 176 In this way, it is possible
"to treat parties not legally married to each other but living together as man and wife the same as married persons",1177 and avoid
equal protection challenges.
Legislatures have responded to the marital rape issue by enacting state statutes which provide immunity to husbands in a variety
of ways. The statute may define rape as intercourse with a female
not the spouse of the actor,1 7 8 or nonconsensual sexual intercourse
by a man with a female not his wife. 179 In these states a husband
may rape his wife with impunity.18 0 The statute may define rape as
any act of sexual gratification between persons not married, where
persons living apart pursuant to a judicial order are not married. 8 1
Most other state statutes contain partial exemptions. For example,
the exemption applies unless the parties are living apart and one
spouse has filed a petition for separation, divorce, annulment, or
separate maintenance. 8 2 In other states the exemption applies unless the parties are separated under a court order. 8 3 Statutes may
176. According to the National Center on Women and Family Law, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Montana and West Virginia have a rape exemption
that applies to cohabitors. See NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW,
MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION PACKET, Item
MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION PACKET].

Nos. 6, 17, and 47 (1987) [hereinafter

177. See State v. Scott, 11 Conn.App. 102, 525 A.2d 1364 (1987); State v. Suggs,
209 Conn. 733, 553 A.2d 1110 (1989). See also State v. Paolella, 210 Conn. 110, 554
A.2d 702 (1989) (statute providing that defendant legally married to victim at
time of alleged offense cannot be convicted of sexual assault does not merely
operate as the procedural bar to prosecution, but establishes a defense which
completely negates criminal culpabilityrequired to convict) (emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
179. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1 (Smith-Hurd 1981), repealed
by P.A. 83-1067 1984)
180. See, e.g., People v. McGuire, 751 P.2d 1011 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). The
McGuire court held that the marriage confers certain "marital rights", so the
marital rape exemption applies to criminal sexual assault. For cases in which
the statute may list marriage as an affirmative defense to a charge of rape, see
Ash v. State, 511 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. 1987); State v. Getward, 89 N.C. App. 26, 365
S.E.2d 209 (1988).
181. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
182. See MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION PACKET, supra note 176, at Item Nos. 150 (1987) and accompanying state-by-state chart.
183. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41(c) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D (1988 & Supp. 1989)(subject to limited divorce decree); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010. (2) (Vernon Supp. 1990); N. DAK. CODE ANN.
§ 12.01-20.01 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon
1983 & Supp. 1990). See also Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591 (Pa.
Super. 1987) (upholding the spousal sexual assault statute); S.C. CODE ANN.
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require the parties to be living apart or one spouse to have begun
legal proceedings at the time of the rape.1 8 4 Others require merely
that the spouses be living apart when the rape occurs;18 5 no separation agreement or court order is required for the husband to be
prosecuted. Still other states allow the husband to be prosecuted for
different degrees of rape, 8 6 or only in certain, circumscribed circumstances.18 7 Several states additionally require a showing of
§ 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-221.1 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (parties must be legally separated, same amount of evidence required as if wife and spouse were strangers, and complaint must be
filed within ninety days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (Supp. 1989).
184. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-35-3 (West 1983 & Supp.); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 14.41 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(E) (1983 & Supp.
1989); OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (L) (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1111(B) (West Supp. 1990) (recognizes spousal rape if force or violence was
used or threatened with power to execute and divorce or separation pending or
granted, under a protective order, or living apart); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.011 (C) (Vernon 1989); see also OAG. Op. Att'y Gen 86-82 (1986).
185. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1401.4, 13-1404 to 13-1406 (1989); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511.(2) (1989); N.
MEX. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10E, 30-9-11 (1983 & Sup. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1427.8. (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (Anderson Supp. 1989) (exemption applies unless spouses are living separately); OH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2907.02 (A)(1) and 2907.12 (A)(1) (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21,
§ 1111 (B)(4) (West Supp. 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3103 (Purdon Supp.
1989); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (requires use of
force, threat of great bodily harm and power of execution and same evidence of
rape as if victim and spouse were strangers); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011
(Vernon 1989) (marriage is defense to rape charge unless spouses are not living
together or an action is pending for separation or divorce); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-61(B) (Supp. 1989) (exemption does not apply if spouses are living apart
or spouse causes serious injury by force or violence). But cf Kizer v. Coin, 228
Va. 256, 258, 321 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1984) (Court held wife had not made clear her
intent to live separately, so rape conviction was overturned. Judge Thomas,
dissenting, noted that "the majority concedes that had the victim not been married to the assailant, the assailant would have been guilty of rape. Nevertheless,
in an opinion which fails to give due precedential weight to the Court's recent
decision in Weishaupt... the majority concludes, in essence, that [defendent]
had a right to do what he did. The majority opinion marks a retreat from the
principles announced in Weishaupt"); Brecheisen v. Mondragon, 833 F.2d 238
(10th Cir. 1987).
186. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70 (West 1989) under which there
is no exemption for first degree forcible rape, but the exemption exists as a
defense to lesser degrees of both sexual assault and rape. See also ILL. REV.
STAT. ANN., ch. 38, para. 12-18(C) and 12-14 (Supp. 1990) (the exemption is abolished only in cases of "aggravated criminal assault" only if assault is reported
within thirty days). For an overall discussion, see THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION PACKET, supra note 176, at Item Nos. 1-50 and state-by-state chart listing
status of laws regarding the marital rape exemption as of 1987.
187. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 774, 775 (1987 & Supp. 1988) (exemption applies to voluntary social companions if victim permitted sexual intercourse within the previous twelve months); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.38, para. 12-18(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (exemption applies to criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and limits aggravated criminal sexual assault,
under para. 12-14, to filings made within thirty days only); for a complete listing, see THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION PACKET, supra note 176, at Item Nos. 150 and accompanying chart.
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physical injury, use or threat of deadly or dangerous force., 8 8 Other
states have created separate spousal rape statutes, 189 showing an
awareness of the problem.
Paradoxically, some statutes have expanded the exemption to
include cohabiting couples' 90 and even social companions!191The
trend toward expanding the exemption seem to be diminishing; in
fact, two states have recently abolished the cohabitors rape exemption, and two have abolished the exemption as it applied to voluntary social companions. 192 To date, nineteen states have abolished
the marital rape exemption, seventeen by legislative and two by ju193
dicial action.
188. See VA. CODE 18.2-61(B) (Supp. 1989)(Act must be against the will of
spouse by force, threat or intimidation. For conviction, spouses must be living
separately, or defendant must have caused serious physical injury by use of
force or violence; further, crime must be reported within ten days); see also
Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984); Kizer v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 256 (1984) (wherein Virginia courts agreed that the rape
statutes are to be construed as excluding the marital exemption).
189. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (1989) (requires use or
threat of force); CAL. PENAL CODE 262 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1.(2)
(1989) (sexual assault of a spouse requires lack of consent and force or serious
bodily injury or a deadly weapon).
190. See, e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. 53-67(b) (West Supp. 1989)(can file
charges against spouse or cohabitor; cohabitation is an affirmative defense to all
but first degree rape); see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3)
(Michie/Bobbis-Merrill Supp.1988) (applies to cohabitors "not married to each
other", or "persons living together as man and wife regardless of the legal status of their relationship."). Other states expanding the exemption to cohabitors
include: Delaware (D.C.A. 772 (b)( 1987 & Supp. 1989)); Montana (MONT. CODE
ANN. 45-5-511(2) (1990)); and West Virginia (W. V. CODE, 61-813-1(2) (1989).
191. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 764, 773, 774, 775 (1987 & Supp. 1988)
(There are two degrees of rape; first degree exempts voluntary social companions who had been permitted sex within the previous twelve months. Taking
this to its logical extreme, a woman could have sexual intercourse on January
1st, not see the man for over eleven months, be attacked by him on December
31 of that year, and he would be exempt); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-511(3) (1988);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
192. Iowa and Minnesota abolished the cohabitors rape exemption: IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709.4 (Supp, 1989) (A cohabitor's exemption exists in third degree,
but not first or second degree, sexual abuse); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West
1987 & Supp. 1989). Hawaii and Maine abrogated the exemption for voluntary
social companions: HAW. PEN CODE § 707-730(a)(1) was abolished (HAW. REV.
STAT. § 707-731 (1990)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 17-A, § 252(3) (1989).
193.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 13A-6-61--62 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE 262
(West 1988); COL. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (1986 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.011 (Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 22 (West
Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.5201 (Supp. 1989-90); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-319, 320 (1985) (See State v. Willis, 223 Neb. 884, 394 N.W.2d 648 (1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (Baldwin 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.355-.375 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-22-1.1 (1988 & Supp. 1989); VA. CODE § 18.2-61(B) (Supp. 1989) ; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit.13 § 3252 (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225.(6) (West Supp. 1987);
WYO. STAT. § 6-2-307 (1977 & Supp. 1989). New York and Georgia have removed
their marital rape exemptions through judicial action. See Warren v. State, 255
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Illinois lags sadly behind the pack. The National Center on Women and Family Law identifies Illinois as having a complete marital
rape exemption, 194 despite the 1984 reforms to the Criminal Code
via House Bill 606. When that legislation was debated in the Illinois
House and Senate, legislators voiced the same, overworked objections that have been previously discussed and rejected in this paper.
Representative Jaffe explained that the statute was designed, based
upon years of study and input from attorneys and other knowledgeable groups, to "consolidate all types of sexual assault into four gender neutral crimes.. .and to define sexual assault in the terms of the
defendants (sic) behavior, rather then (sic) the state of mind of the
victim."'195 Jaffe further explained that the bill was intended to remove the requirement of a showing that the victim resisted the attack.196 If passed, the bill would virtually extinguish the marital
rape exemption.
Other legislators were concerned that a husband would have to
prove his innocence if charged with spousal rape by his wife, 1 97 or
that a husband could be charged with sexual assault for hugging his
wife. 198 Representative Friedrich said,"I think forcible rape is [the]
most despicable crime that could be committed, but I would not like
to make the solution so open that all somebody has to do is point
their finger at somebody and ruin their life. And I think you've
opened it up to the point where there is absolutely no defense...
Even more alarming were the comments of Congresswoman Wojcik, who reluctantly voted for House Bill 606, but,
would certainly of liked to have seen an Amendment or to see the
spouse face a battery charge. If a man is accused of raping his wife, he's
going to be behind bars for six years. If he had battery, it would not be
as severe. I do not believe
that once you take the marriage bond that a
200
wife can claim rape.
In the Illinois Senate, House Bill 606 faced further restricGa. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567,

485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985). See also Merton v.
State, 500 So.2d 1301 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986), where the court held that the mari-

tal exemption for rape found in the Alabama rape statute violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and severed the section from
the statute.
194. THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION

PACKET,

supra note 176 at Item No. 13

("[tihe exemption is abolished only in 'aggravated criminal sexual assault' if the
assault is reported within 30 days.").
195. State of Illinois, 83rd General Assembly, House of Representatives,
Transcription Debate, May 10, 1983, at 162.
196. Id. at 163-64.
197. Id. at 164.
198. Id. at 169.
199. Id. at 169.

200. Id. at 170-71.
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tions,20 1 yet the fears persisted. Senator Philip questioned whether
one spouse might use the law as a weapon in a divorce case, 20 2 and,
despite Senator Netsch's assurances about the small number of past
prosecutions and the bill's safeguards, remarked, "[i]f this doesn't
leave a man at a disadvantage, I don't know what does... any man
that votes for this ought. . .ought to take a second think and
203
look."
Overall, the 1984 changes to the Criminal Code did little to improve the plight of Illinois women exposed to the violence of marital rape. House Bill 606, in its final, amended form, is merely a
bandage on an open, gangrenous wound. Illinois is one of the most
industrial and populous states, yet it is one of only two states which
20 4
has yet to grapple earnestly with the problem of marital rape.
Conclusion
States which allow the marital rape exemption to exist as viable law in any form are accomplices to a crime which "degrades
women in the eyes of the law and society.. .helps perpetuate myths
and generalizations as to the husband's dominance in the marriage.. .[and] facilitates a cycle of violence and humiliation unheard
of in any other context. '20 5 If as many as two million women annually are being raped with impunity by their husbands,2 06 it is difficult to imagine why legislators have failed to respond. "It has been
suggested that the frequency of the crime may even account for the
sluggishness of male legislators to repeal the marital exemption
statutes." 20 7 Aryeh Neier, former executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, suggests another reason why the exemption, in some form, remains law in a majority of states. He says,
"[t]he law serves a symbolic purpose as well as an enforcement purpose. The law cannot be neutral on this issue. It either protects the
victims of rape or it protects the rapist. If the law exempts husbands
from rape charges, the implication is that it condones husbands rap20 8
ing wives."
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State of Illinois, 83rd General Assembly, Senate Transcription Debate,
1983, at 92.
Id. at 93.
Id at 94-95.
Mississippi is the other state which has addressed the issue. See Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1988). The statute does not directly address the
issue of spousal immunity, so the common law exemption is presumed to apply;
however, at least one court has held that the common law exemption does not
exist. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981); see also THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION PACKET, supra note 176, at Issue No. 24.
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207. Id. at 57.
208. Griffin, supra, note 4, at 57.
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The laws seem to bear out this alarming proposition. Nearly all
states presently recognize a wife's right to bring criminal charges
against her husband for forcible, nonconsensual rape, but only
under certain circumstances. 20 9 This seems to be an improvement;
however, the fact that wives must be living apart and/or seeking
separation or dissolution implies that the marital rape exemption
still has validity today.210 Even though courts in states without a
statutory spousal exemption in their laws may be sympathetic, they
may not have the power to modify the common law.2 11 Ultimately,
the job rests with the state legislatures to abrogate the shields
which protect transgressing husbands from prosecution for behavior, which, if done to a stranger, would be criminal.
The origins of the marital rape exemption are tenuous, resting
as they do upon Hale's extra-judicial 212 statement, which "was not
law, common or otherwise. At best it was Hale's pronouncement of
'213
It
what he observed to be a custom in 17th century England.
retains within the law the archaic, sexist notion that the wife is
property of her husband, a concept long ago discarded in civilized
countries. Yet vestiges of the marital rape exemption still exist in
the state statutes, reminders of that abandoned notion of women as
property. As the court said in State v. Rider, referring to Hale's assertion, "[tihat this single sentence, which stands alone, naked of
citation to any authority, judicial or otherwise, could be considered
sufficient precedent to allow a husband to rape with impunity his
wife baffles all sense of logic. '214 Although progress has been made
in some states in the form of legislative reform or judicial action
abolishing the exemption, the issue is far from decided. Studies reveal that marital rape is a widespread problem, causing serious,
long-lasting harm to victims. All justifications and practical considerations for the exemptions have been considered and rejected; yet
in a majority of states, the rights of married women to make fundamental decisions about their bodily integrity are being denied by
virtue of the exemption. Perhaps Hale's reasoning might have been
persuasive when marriages were non-retractable, but in light of
changes in society and the status of women, the exemption is an
archaic relic. As Justice Holmes noted almost one hundred years
ago:
209.
210.
211.
(Supp.
212.
213.
(1984).
214.

See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 8, at 306-23.
See Comment, supra note 17, at 198; see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99
1987).
Comment, supra note 65, at 369.
Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 392, 315 S.E.2d 847, 850
State v. Rider, 449 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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Legal Rape: The Marital Rape Exemption

It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the
215
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Until the issue of the marital rape exemption is addressed by politicians and abrogated from all state statutes, making marital rape a
legally punishable crime, married women in states recognizing the
exemption will continue to be victimized without redress.

215. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).

